fundamentalthoughantagonisticimperatives:thatgovernmentalpowerultimatelyisgeneratedfromthe'consent of the people' and that, to be sustained and effective, such power must be divided, constrained, and exercised through distinctive institutional forms. The people, in Maistre's words, 'are a sovereign that cannot exercise sovereignty';thepowertheypossess,itwouldappear,canonlybeexercisedthroughconstitutionalformsalready establishedorintheprocessofbeingestablished.Thisindicatedwhat,initsmostelementaryformulation,might be called the paradox of constitutionalism." M. Loughlin and N. Walker, Introduction, in THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 1, 1 (M. Loughlin and N. Walker eds., Oxford, Oxford University Press 2007). Referring to this tensionbetweenconstituentpowerandconstitutedpoweras'paradox'isnotconvincingforothers.Galligan,for example,reviewingtheabovebook,doubtedtheutilityofsuch'paradox'forconstitutionaltheory,noticingthat: "Modernconstitutionalism,theeditorsofthecollectionofessaysunderreviewclaim,hasatitscentreaparadox betweenthepeopleassovereignorconstituentpowerandtheconstitution;constitutionsarethecreationofthe peopleyet,oncecreated,imposerestraintsonthem."Thenheadded:"Theallegedparadoxistakenseriouslyina few,paidlip-serviceinothersandignoredintherest.Thatisagoodthingsincetheparadoxisoflimitedutilityto constitutionaltheory."D.J. Galligan,TheParadoxofConstitutionalismorthePotentialofConstitutionalTheory,28 OJLS343,343(2008) .Others,perhapsmoreappropriately,use'paradox'nottodescribeconstitutionalismassuch, but rather to describe its possible accommodation with other concepts such as sovereignty and/or democracy: "Constitutionalism, democracy and sovereignty are both complementary and conflicting terms. At one level, the Thissuggestionhastheadvantageofresolvingtheparadoxinconstitutionalism:theruleoflaw ispresentedasacamouflage,inwhichtheappearanceofattributiontothepeopleispresented asanalternativetotherealattribution.Inasense,however,itseemsthatthecamouflageisa necessary,almostinevitable,fiction;largelybecauseitisimpossibletoknowwhatthepeople want-admittingatthefirstplacethatthepeoplecaneverhaveoneuniquewill 5 -butmost importantly,becauseeventhosewhopretendtoknowwhatthepeoplewantandpretendto have the authority to express that will, are -if they want to be coherent with what they pretend -always subject and subordinate to the continuously changing will of the people; in otherwords,itisbytheirsamepresupposition(expressingthepeople'swill)thattheymaybe discreditedorevenresistedbyothercompetingauthorities.Suchsituationleadsinevitablyto whatcanbedescribedasacontinuousandperpetualrevolution,ergotothecompleteopposite ofwhatpoliticalorganizationis,atfirstplace.
TherejectionofconstitutionalisminArabstates,whichmeanstherejectionofbothdemocracy andtheRuleofthelaw,inthenameofthat'people',withitsculturalandreligiousparticularity (inwhichcaseAraborMuslimstateispresentedasspecial,unique,tobedistinguishedfrom other kinds of state, such as Western states for example) is nothing else but a contradiction. Thesimplefactthatapeoplearedefinedbyapoliticalorganizationatthefirstplacemeansthat constitutionaldesiretosubjecttheexerciseofstatepowertocertainnormativelimitsappearstobeatoddswith bothassertionsofpopularandnationalsovereigntyandtherelatedviewthattheonlylegitimatesourceoflawor valuelieswiththepeopleandtheinstitutionsthatembodytheirwill.Atanotherlevel,constitutionsmaybeseen as providing the rules and institutional mechanisms necessary to give expression to that will." R. Bellamy, Introduction: Constitutionalism, democracy and Sovereignty, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND SOVEREIGNTY: AMERICANANDEUROPEANPERSPECTIVES1,1(R.Bellamyed., Averbury,1996) .ItiswithinthislastprecisionthatImake useofthe'paradoxofconstitutionalism'inthispaper. thetimeofcompleterevolutionisover,andthefictionofminimalattributionhadstarted.In suchacontext,theuseofthe'people'torejectlimitationongovernmentisonlyanexcuseof theexistingregimestoresisttransitiontodemocracyandtheruleoflaw.
In this paper, I will suggest considering constitutionalism as an opportunity, rather than a paradox, for contemporary Arab states in need for justifying their authority, their legitimacy, andtheirsameexistenceasstates.Iwillfirstassesshow'popularsovereignty'iscentralinmost constitutionsofArabstates(SectionII).DespitethedemocraticdeficiencypresentinmostArab states, this reference is relevant in that it is connected to an identity, which needs to be justified by reference to the state-produced constitution and law (Section III). This people (demos)competewithothernarratives,includingArabnationalism,andIslamism.Forboth,the state is a too narrow to include the Arab nation or the Islamic umma (Section IV). While territorialnationalismseemstoprevail,theissueofpre-establishedidentity,andtheimpactit hasonthestateisremarkable,andneedtobedulyconsidered(SectionV).Insuchacontext, the constitution, more than a binding law limiting the government, is only one of the many ways the existing regimes talk to different constituencies, whether local, regional, or international, searching for legitimacy (Section VI). A different ways of looking at Shari'a in constitutional text is also discussed, i.e. a reading that sees in this the development of what some called Islamic constitutionalism (Section VII). Finally, I will suggest relocating the discussion regarding modern constitutionalism, to connect it with the development of both international law and national domestic legal systems, following the Second World War (SectionVII).Intheconclusion,Iwillsuggestredirectingthedebatedtowardsthetheoryofthe state,ratherasanissueofaccommodationofspecificcultureorreligioninthestatelegalorder (SectionIX).
Arab states may refer to remote historical, cultural, social and political experiences. Nevertheless, in their current territorial forms, they are a very recent product. Whether this wasacolonialproduct, 6 oragenuinedevelopment, 7 areactionagainstanarchism, 8 orvictory 6 This is the case, at least, for most of them. For some scholars, this modern concept of state is alien to 'Arabs' sinceoriginallytheywereatribalsociety,notcitizens-theywereonlykinsmenunitedbybloodties.See,e.g.,P.J. VATIKIOTIS,ISLAMANDTHESTATE19(London,CroomHelm1987).Accordingly,forthemitmaybesimplytheresultof colonialismandasaresultoftheimpactofWesternpowersonthem.
7 Iliya Harik, for example, traces the origin of various Arab states, and identifies their structure, power base, legitimacy, and traditions by proposing five different types of state: (1) the imam-chief system as in the case of North Yemen, Oman and Morocco; (2) the alliance system of chiefs and imams as in Saudi Arabia; (3) the traditionalsecularsysteminwhichauthorityisinvestedinadynasty,freefromreligiousattributesasinLebanon andthesmallerGulfStates;(4)thebureaucratic-oligarchytypeinwhichauthorityisbasicallyintheurbancasteof garrisoncommanders,assistedbyanextensiveadministrativeapparatusasinEgyptandtheNorthAfricaStates; and(5)thecolonially-createdstatesystem,comprisingtheFertileCrescentStates(withtheexceptionofLebanon), carvedfromthedefunctOttomanEmpirebytheEuropeancolonialpowers.SeeGh.Salamé,Introduction,inTHE FOUNDATIONSOFTHEARABSTATE1,5-6(GhSalaméed.,London,CroomHelmLtd1987 
II.ARABCONSTITUTIONSANDPOPULARSOVEREIGNTY
The 'Constitution', identified since the eighteenth century with a single document governing the government, has its roots in two historical experiences, the American and French London,CroomHelmLtd1987) .SuchhistoricaldatasuggestthatonlylimitednumberofArabstates(particularly theFertileCrescent)arethedirectcreationofcolonialism,andtheBritishandFrenchantagonismintheMiddle East, as argued by Burhan Ghalioun for example: "[Q]uant au Croissant Fertile, il est partagé entre des Etats artificiels distribués en zones d'influences aux colonialismes antagonistes anglais et français." B. GHALIOUN, LE MALAISE ARABE -L'ETATCONTRELANATION24(Paris,LaDécouverte1991).Admittingthattheabovethesisrelatedto theoriginofterritorialArabstatesiscorrect,itisnonethelessundeniablethatcolonialismandforeigninterference largely influenced the boundaries of territorial Arab states and gave them the shape they have right now. Iliya Harik himself recognizes that: "Colonialism affected the boundaries of Arab states, but it did not, with the exceptionoftheFertileCrescentcase,createthem.Colonialismgavemoredefinitiveformtotheindigenousstates andintroducedelementsofmodernadministrationtothem."Quotedin:Salamé,supra,at6.ForBahgatKorany: "ThepresentdemarcationoftheArabterritorialstateisindeedaphenomenonmadeinEurope.Threehistorical phasesaretraced:a)theriseandthecharacteristicsoftheWestfaliasystemof1648whichendedEurope'swarsof religionandinitiatedaninternationalsystemofsovereignstates;b)dismembermentoftheOttomanempireand itsintegrationintotheEuropeansystem;andc)theriseofthemandatesysteminitsplaceandtheresultingArab territorialstates."B.Korany,AlienandBesiegedYetHeretoStay: TheContradictionsoftheArabTerritorialState, inTHEFOUNDATIONSOFTHEARABSTATE47,48(GhSalaméed.,London,CroomHelmLtd1987) .However,iftheforeign originofterritorialArabstates,infact,mayprovideanexplanationofthecreationofmanyArabstates(asmuchas manyotherstatesinallovertheworld),itcannotexplainorjustifytheircontinuingconsolidationandsupremacy. AspointedoutbyKorany:"Animportantquestionshouldthenbeexplicitlyraised:ifthecontradictionsoftheArab territorial state are closely related to its foreign origin, does this foreign origin provide sufficient and necessary reasonsalsotoexplainitscontinuingconsolidationandsupremacy?"Id.at73. 8 Accordingly,territorialstatesaresimplyareactionagainstarchaismandakindofadaptationtonewworldorder.
As pointed out by Ghalioun, the Arab state is not the embodiment of the oriental or Islamist state, but is the reaction or fear of archaism in the Arab world. Arabs in fact felt the necessity to adapt themselves to the new worldorder.SeeGhalioun,supranote7,at53-66. 9 The absence of alternatives such as a 'pan-' state, whether Islamic or Arab nationalist, has until now failed to realizeitsobjectives. SeeKorany, supranote7, at74. 10 ThedebateovertheoriginofmodernArabstateshadneverreallycometoanend.AspointedoutbySalamé: "Thisparticulardebate,concerningtheoriginalsinofstatecreation,wasneverclosedintheArabWorld.Towhat extenttheseArabstateswerecreatedbyaforeign,alien,andhostilewill?"Salamé,supranote7,at3. AccordingtoEsmein,theeighteenthcenturyconceptofconstitutionasafundamentalandsystematicwritten lawisbasedonthreeideas:1)Thesuperiorityofawrittenlawoveracustomaryonewasgenerallyagreedonat the time: the same should apply to constitutional law; 2) The people of the eighteenth century Revolution consideredanewconstitution,editedbynationalsovereignty,asatruerenewalofthesocialcontract:assuch,it wasnecessarytoregistertheclausesofthatcontractinthemostsolemnandcompleteform;3)Theythoughtthat a clear, systematic presentation of such a document in a clear and systematic way would provide an excellent meansofpoliticaleducation,sinceitwouldprovidethecitizenswiththeknowledgeanddesirefortheirrights. See AESMEIN,ELEMENTSDEDROITCONSTITUTIONNELFRANÇAISETCOMPARE603-4(1927) .
14 Arjomand distinguishes five stage s in world constitutional history, each with its typical mode of constitutionmaking: 1) The medieval and pre-modern era down to the eighteenth century. 2) The modern stage of political reconstructionrationaldesignintheageofdemocraticrevolutionsinthelateeighteenthcentury.3)Theageof modernization in the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. 4) The era of ideological constitutionsasinstrumentofsocialtransformationaccordingtototalideologiesandtheiroffspring . 5)Theeraofnewconstitutionalismsince1989. SeeSaïdAmirArjomand,ConstitutionalDevelopmentandPolitical ReconstructionfromNation-BuildingtoNewConstitutionalism,inCONSTITUTIONALISMANDPOLITICALRECONSTRUCTION3, 6-7(SaïdAmirArjomanded.,Leiden-Boston,Brill2007 Constitutionalism?ViewsfromthePostocolony,1945 -2000 .AnewwaveofconstitutionalmovementoccurredinpostCommunistconstitutionalreconstructionofthe1990s.SeeArjomand,supra,at4.
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AspointedoutbyAckerman:"AfunnythinghappenedtoAmericansonthewaytothetwentyfirstcentury.We havelostourabilitytowritedownournewconstitutionalcommitmentsintheold-fashionedway.Thisisnosmall problem for a country that imagines itself living under a written Constitution." Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution120HARV.L. REV1737,1741 REV1737, (2007 For Sathyamurthy, a written constitution serves as an instrument of political cohesion in Postcolonial states: "Constitutions were expected to fulfill a dual role, enabling a smooth and orderly transition from anticolonial struggle to independent self-rule, and at the same time securing for the new regime the political fruits of nationhood,newstatestructures,legitimacy(domesticandinternational),andsovereignty [.] 4INT'LJ.CONST.L.439,453(2006) .SimilarargumentcanbeadvancedtoArabconstitutions.They maynotcorrespondtoliberalconstitutionalismbuttheystillhavesomethingtotell.Insuchacontext,havinga written constitution may serve the objective of creating a façade constitution, setting out a program not a regulatorytool.AspointedoutbyNathanBrown,itistheexistingregimesintheArabworldthathadcomposed the constitutions not the other way around. In this sense, constitutions were designed to enable these existing regimes, whether through fiscal reform, establishing sovereignty, or proclaiming new ideological directions. See Brown, supranote21, at55.Forhim:"mostconstitutionaldocuments[intheArabWorld] havebeenpromulgated less by the nation assembled than by existing regimes seeking tools to enable them to face domestic and internationalchallenges."Id.at48.
24
As pointed out by Brown: "the past two decades have seen a definite (if limited) upsurge of interest in constitutionalismintheArabWorld."Id.at48.Theauthor,however,cautions,thischangeshouldnotobscurean underlyingcontinuity:"whiletheArabworldhasjoinedtheglobaltrendtowardgreaterinterestinconstitutional structures,thechangesofthepastfewdecadeshavenotreversedthepatternsofthepast:constitutionsremain enablingdocumentsinvarietyofsettings."Id.at49. 25 communistcountries,though.Similarmovementoccurredinallovertheworld.Basedonempiricaldata,Goshows thatmanyofthepostcolonialconstitutionsinexistencein2000werewritteninthe1990s.SeeGo,supranote14, at97-8.Thisiswhysomeauthorstalkabouttheeraof"newconstitutionalism" (SeeArjomand, supranote14, at3) or'newglobalizingconstitutionalism' (SeeGo, supranote14, at103) .Similarmovement,asrightlypointedoutby is also present in the Arab world, that Nathan Brown calls "constitutional experimentation" while questioning whetherornotitcouldbeconsideredasa"FourthConstitutionalMoment. "Brown, supranote21, at56.Before that, Suchsignsofchangecanbeseeninthreedifferentways.First,manyArabmonarchiesoftheArabianPeninsula, historicallythemostreluctanttoissueconstitutionshavefinallyjoinedthefold,adoptingnewconstitutions.Thisis thecaseofSaudiArabiaandOmanwhichadoptedBasicLawsinthe1990s,UnitedArabEmiratesmadeitsformer "temporary"constitution,apermanentone.Kuwaitrestoredfullparliamentaryandconstitutionallifein1992and similarprocessoccurredinBahrainin2002.Yemen,theonlyrepublicofthePeninsula,wroteanewconstitutionin 1991.Second,someotherArabcountrieshadamendedtheirconstitutionaltextsorissuednewonestonegotiate politicalliberalization,suchasEgypt,Morocco,Jordan,Algeria,Tunisia,andYemen.Third,infewothercountries, former constitutional structures (mainly constitutional courts and parliament) have begun to revive allowing for some constitutional openings. This is the case of Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court, or the parliamentary experienceofJordan,PalestineandKuweit.Fourth,aspecialcaseofconstitutionmakinginIraqoccurredafterthe Americaninvasion.Thisprocessisdirectlyrelatedtothisforcedchangeintheregime. In the Arab world, constitutions may describe a variety of political structures: federal, as in the United Arab EmiratesandtheSudan;unitary,asinTunisia;aconstitutionalmonarchy,asinJordan;arepublic,asinEgypt;ora traditional hereditary monarchy, as in Saudi Arabia. While most Arab constitutions are documents with roughly similarprovisions,someconstitutionsarenoteworthyproductsofhistoricalandpoliticalcircumstances. InSaudi Arabia, for example, the Koran itself is considered the constitution, accompanied by a series of royal decrees compiledtofunctionasamanualfortheapplicationofitsprinciples.InLibya,theConstitutionalProclamation,the GreenBookwrittenbyMuammarQaddafiandthePeople'sDeclarationtogetherconstitutetheBasicLawofthe land.Proceduresforconstitutionalamendmentsvary;sometimesrequiringdirectreferendaorlegislativeaction, while in some countries, the head of the state may issue amendments by decree. However, most Arab states adaptedwrittenandrigidconstitutions.InpreviousstudyIindentifiedsomeofthosecharacteristics:1)ManyArab states adapted constitutions after independence (Algiers gained independence on 5 July 1962, and adopted its Constitution on 10 September 1963 (suspended in 1965; the second Constitution was adopted in 1976 and amended in 1979, 1988, 1989, 1996) ; Bahrain gained independence on 15 August 1971, and adopted its Constitutionon6December1973(suspendedin1975andadoptedtheNationalCharterin2001afterapopular referendum); the United Arab Emirates gained independence on 2 December 1971 and adopted a provisional constitutiononthesamedate(thatbecamepermanentin1996);Kuwaitgainedindependenceon19July1961and adopteditsconstitutionayearlater;Mauritaniaadopteditsconstitutionimmediatelyafterindependencein1961). 2) Some constitutions were adopted before independence, such as the Lebanese one in 1926 (while Lebanon gainedindependenceon22November1943).3)Constitutionsthatwereadoptedbecauseofnewcircumstances suchasthatofJordanin1952,aftertheunificationofthetwobanksoftheriver,andIraqin1968,aftertheBa'thi revolution.4)TherearestateswithaspecialconstitutionalhistorysuchasEgypt,whichenjoyedcertainautonomy within the Ottoman Empire, and began very early on, the codification process. Egypt was also familiar with differentconstitutions.5)SomesystemsarerelatedtospecialcircumstancessuchasSaudiArabia,whichhasno constitutionbuttheShari'a;andLibyawhichhasaConstitutionalProclamation-TheGreenBookandapopular See,e.g.Article6oftheConstitutionofAlgeria(1996 Article6oftheConstitutionofKuwait (1962); Article2oftheConstitutionofMorocco(1996); Article3oftheConstitutionofTunisia(2002) . 31 See,e.g.,theConstitutionofJordan (1952 states, is not God nor the Holy Book of any particular religion, but rather lies in a humanly establishedcommunity,territoriallydefined,thereflectionoftheneedsofitstime,contingent toimmanentneedsandwill.
The fact that most Arab states, although largely undemocratic, adopt rigid constitutions, and refer to the people as source of authority, proves the importance this principle for the legitimacy of Arab states, in a way similar to other countries all over the world. Most importantly, it is of particular relevance for the territorially defined Arab states, on the one hand, to distinguish themselves from neighboring Arab states and peoples, although sharing the same belonging to the Arab nation, and on the other, to accommodate religious and sectarian diversities within its borders. Accordingly, despite being absented and marginalized fromtherealaffairsofthestate,thereferencetothe'people'inconstitutionaltextsisrelevant forcontemporaryArabstates.Itmeansthatauthorityisexercisedbyhumanbeings,onhuman beings, and with the authority of human beings themselves. Most importantly, it means that authorityincontemporaryArabstatesis,bydefinition,exercisedbysecular,andnotdivineor transcendental,power.
44

III.SOVEREIGNTERRITORIALSTATES
Popular sovereignty as a theoretical principle may be embodied in most constitutions, but sovereignty of the people, even in democracies, is only a slogan without real content. 45 It is being under the same law and institutions that makes of them one people as 'demos'.
46
The people are not free to exercise direct power, but only through their representative government.Theymayhavearoletoplayincertaincircumstances,butonlyiftheconstitution permitsthat.Accordingly,theconstitution,enactedbytheconstituentpower,theprerogative of the sovereign, frame the way the people, the governed, participate in deciding their own destiny. 47 44 AsfortheimpactofthereferencetoIslamandShari'a,seetextaccompanyingnotes86-132. EveninthecaseofFrance,the'generalwill',stillinfluentialandcentralinFrenchconstitutionaltradition,isnot shaped directly by the people, but only in an indirect way, through the available constitutional institutions. In Ifitisnotthepeople,then,whoisthesovereign,whosewillisembodiedintheconstitution? What are the criteria to know which forms of government fit the needs of pre-established community, in order to accommodate the sovereign power in the state? Many answers are theoretically possible; my suggestion is to consider the particular place the 'state' had in modern societies. In the 19 th century, indeed, attributing sovereignty to the state resolved a struggle between those favoring the sovereignty of the monarch and those favoring popular sovereignty. State sovereignty, as a compromise between both doctrines, gave the state the centralplaceitoccupied,whichleadtothedenominationofStaatsrecht(thelawofthestate), insteadofVerfassungsrecht (constitutionallaw) . 48 It is the state, acquiring a personality, which is the new sovereign. This State-Sovereign is omnipresentandabsoluteinthatitisnomoreoneofthemanyformspoliticalcommunitiescan beshaped.ItisTheForm,almosttheonlyone,centralinbothdomesticandinternationallaw. It is this State-Sovereign that characterizes and distinguishes modern Arab states.
49
It is the statethatisatthecenterofattention;itssecurity,stability,andprotectionhavepriorityover whatever other objectives in the legal and political system. The state here is priceless and everything else can be sacrificed. Although recognized as citizens, those are no more than subjects on which the state exercise its authority, indiscreetly. It does not serve other objectives, but the preservation of itself is the objective. It is absolute and knows no limits whatsoever.
SuchastateseesinthesimilarlyevolvingneighboringArabstatesasapotentialdanger. 50 The result of this evolution is that Arab states are becoming increasingly entrenched and naturalized.
51 TheoilphenomenonwiththedisparitiesinrichnessbetweenArabstatesserves contemporaryFrance,"theshapingofthegeneralwilldependsontheexecutiveandontheConstitutionalCouncil as well as on the legislature" (Rosenfeld, supra note 20, at 13) (making reference to the contribution of: D. Rousseau'scontributiontothevolumeheedited).
48
SeeA.V.Bogdandy,Thepastandpromiseofdoctrinalconstructivism:Astrategyforrespondingtothechallenges facing constitutional scholarship in Europe, 7 INT.L J. CONST. L. 364, 385 (2009) . For this reason constitutional scholarship in Germany is as a separate discipline is almost always connected with German legal scholarship, in particular,theso-calledpositivistlegalmethodof"statelegalpositivism"(derstaatsrechtlichePositivismus). AccordingtoGhalioun,thestatebecameatthecoreofthedebateovernationalism:"L'épuisementdudébat surl'identitéaouvertengrand…celuidel'Etat,sanature,sesorigines,sesstratégiesetsonavenir.Lesanalystes dans ce domaine… n'ont jamais été systématiques dans le Monde Arabe. Et même si le débat sur la nation continue à exister, son objet véritable n'est autre que l'Etat, dans sa morphologie ou dans les structures de ces pouvoirs."GHALIOUN,supranote7,at53. "The gap between 'said' and 'done' is a reflection of a contradiction between indigenous grass-roots political culture(whichis'pan'-orparticularisticethnic)andtheimportedéliteculture,whichemphasizesthenation-state astheframeofreference."SeeKorany,supranote7,at49. thatthegapismuchdeeperthanthedichotomyelite-indigenous.Itisrelatedtotheidentityof eachArabpeople,asbeingpartoftheArabnation-and,maybe,theIslamicnation-whileat the same time defending its territorially-defined sovereignty. It is a dichotomy between a people,historically,culturallyandlargelyreligiouslydefined,andapeopleofaparticularstate, legally established. At least per regions (for example, the Fertile Crescent, Arabian Peninsula, North African Arab Countries, the Maghreb countries), similarities are so evident that any distinctionbasedon'nationality'isoftendifficulttodefend,unlessbymakingreferencetothe law,whichcreatesdistinguishedcitizenships,strictlyrelatedtoeachstate,territoriallydefined.
IV.NATIONALISMWITHOUTTHENATION
NationalismmayhaverapidlyinvadedArabmentality,asmuchasinmanyotherpartsofthe world, giving rise to territorially defined modern states. However, this invasion has not been metwithacleardefinitionofwhatexactlythenationis.
58 TherelationbetweenArab'nation' and single Arab 'people' may not be well comprehended using concepts such as 'nation' and 'people '. 59 Infact,thesetwoconceptshavetobeunderstoodinthelightofthewiderconcept of the umma, 60 which is often used to refer to Islamic community or the community of 58 SeeSalamé,supranote7,at4.
59 Thereisnotoneuniquedefinitionfortheconceptofnation,peopleandstate.Actually,thesetermsareoften used as synonymous, while they are not. As an example of that confusion, we will mention the charter of the United Nations. In fact, we read in its first beginning: "we the peoples of the United Nations…" while the organizationmembershipislimitedtostates.Peoplessubjectivity,infactislimitedtotherecognitionofpeople's right to self-determination, which is not interpreted pacifically, especially when it does mean the right to statehood,sincetheUnitedNationsisbasedonsovereigntyofmemberstates.Similarconfusionoccurswiththe Arabic terminology. The concept umma (translated as a nation) is used when it refers to Islamic and/or Arab nation,whilesha'b(translatedaspeople)referstosingleArabpeoplesanddawla(translatedasstate)referstothe territorial Arab states (dawla qutryya). The term dawla is relatively modern and refers to ruler's (or dynasty of rulers)administrationintherecentpast,similartotheconceptofSultanateintheOttomanEmpire.Theconceptof ardorarady(territoryorterritories)referstoalltheArabterritoriesasoneunitortotheterritoryofsingleArab states,whiletheconceptquturrefersonlytotheterritoryofasinglestate.Inaddition,theadjectiveoftheword 'nation' (translated as 'national') is qawmiyya when it refers to the Arab nation, while it is wataniyya (also translatedas'national')whenitisrelatedtotheterritorialArabnationalism,alsomeaningpatriotism.Whilethe concept of muwatana refers to the citizenship; this concept has its origin in watan that is homeland, although sometimesitisusedtorefertoArabland,alwatanal-arabi!Formore,seeKhalil,supranote27,at86-7. 60 Inhisbook,Az-Zahirfima'aniKalimatan-Nas,Ibnal-Anbarinotesthatthetermumma(nation)occursineight different senses in Arabic. Some of these meanings are: a community or a group of people; a religion; time… Besides, the terms nation (umma) and mother (umm) prove by virtue of their being derived from the same linguisticroot,that'nation'isanextensionofone'sfamily-indeeditisthebondofbrotherhoodparexcellence.'A nation is a uterine experience', says al-Arsuzi, meaning that it is an extension of foetal life. In the al-muheit dictionarythetermummameansagroupofpeople(nas)unitedbycommonland,language,tradition,interests, emotionsandaspirations;Accordingly,theArabswouldbeconsideredasonecompleteummaalthoughtheymay believers (al-ummaal-Islameyya) or toArabnation (al-umma al-'arabeyya As human beings, nations also have their history. Individuals are born and integrated within thatcommunity,oftenwithouttheirownchoice.Astatemayexistonedayandmaydisappear the next. Once created, however, the state is never the product of nothing, because "nothingness"simplydoesnotexist.Itisalwaysastateofaparticularpeoplewhomayhave their own history, language and culture. 65 Most importantly, it is precisely this identity that explains,justifiesandpushestowardstheindependence,forthosecountrieswhichwereunder colonial regimes and occupation. It is precisely that distinctiveness from other nations that pushestowardstheassertionofnationalidentity,andmayleadtodifferentformsofpolitical self-expression,includingtheorganizationintoanewstate. Inorderthatalltheabovemakessense,however,thereshouldbeaconnectionbetweenthreeelements:the sovereign, the constitution and the constitutional form. A constitution, limiting branches of government, is intrinsicallyconnectedtothesovereign.Aconstitutiondoesnotnecessarilylimitthesovereign,becausethisdoes notmakesense(atleastintermsoflegality-illegality);ratheritenableshisabsencefromdaytodaypolitics.The constitutional from enables branches of government to exercise their power with authority, because they are shapedandframedbytheconstitution,connectedtothesovereign. IrefertodemosandethnosinthispaperinthesamewayusedbyTöpperwien:Demos(staatsvolk)referstothe totality of citizens while ethnos (Volk) is a community based on the belief in a common descent or culture. N. TÖPPERWIEN,NATION-STATEANDNORMATIVEDIVERSITY4-5(Bâle,Genève,Munich,Helbing&Lichtenhahn2001).Preuss distinguishes between two different conceptions of the nation, the French and the German (which is also the concept of nation also present in Eastern Europe too). The French perceives the nation as "a rational and deliberativecommunityofcitizensboundtogetherbyasocialcontractdesignedtoimplementthegeneralwill." WhiletheGermanandEasternEuropeimageofthenationas"asprepoliticalcommunitycharacterizedbyethnic homogeneity."Rosenfeld,supranote20,at18(commentingonPreusscontributiontothevolumeheedited).
V.THECONSTITUTIONANDTHEPRE-ESTABLISHEDIDENTITY
70
In the United States, the 'nation' and the 'culture' are not linked at all; culture is not relevant for the state because it was not relevant for the nation. In France, things are different, the nation creates and defines the culture;accordingly,thecultureisrelevantforthenationandforthestatealthoughitwasnotrelevantfornationbuilding.InGermany,theculturedefinesthenation;consequently,thecultureisrelevantforthenationandthe state,andwasalreadyrelevantforthenation-building. OxfordUniversityPress,2007 ,375pp,6INT.LJ.CONST.L.358,358(2008 .
72
For whom the "validity of the first constitution is the last presupposition, the final postulate, upon which the validityofallthenormsofourlegalorderdepends"HANSKELSEN,GENERALTHEORYOFLAWANDSTATE115(A.Wedberg trans., Clark,NewJersey,TheLawbookExchange2007(1945 ).Formore,see:HANSKELSEN,PURETHEORYOFLAW201-5(M. Knighttrans.,Clark,NewJersey,TheLawbookExchange,2009 (1967 CONST.L.224,227(2003) .
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TheFrenchrevolutiongivesrisetotworelated,butcompletelydifferentdoctrines:thepopularsovereigntyand nationalsovereignty.Whilepopularsovereigntyreferstoapeople(conceivedasacollectivityofindividualsliving within a given territory) who can exercise sovereignty, directly or indirectly (through representatives), national sovereigntyreferstoanabstractentity,thenation,whichiscomposed,notonlyofindividualslivingatagiventime but also of members of past and future generations (thus implying the existence of general interests that transcendtheparticularinterestsoflivingindividuals).Seeid.at227-8. Suchtheories,withhighdegreeofarticulationwithinthepoliticaltheorytrytoexplainthebeginningofpolities. Seeid.at358.Theoriesof'socialcontract'attheoriginofstates,whetherthiscontractisarealhistoricaleventor an imagined one, provide an interesting account that merits further consideration. As rightly pointed out by Nathan Brown, constitutionalism and constitution-writing have been dominated by metaphors of collective selfdefinition:"aconstitutionisanattemptbyapoliticalcommunitytoexpressthefundamentalrulesandvaluesof political life." Brown, supra note 21, at 47. However, there are different approaches to social contract. Venter distinguishesatleastthree:1)TheBritishapproach-whichdidnotneedawrittenconstitution-emphasizesthe political self-government of society through parliament. 2) The French approach -which had few scruples in replacing its constitutions -emphasizes the nation as it is manifested in the state. The American social contract approach reflects the American concern with a society consisting of a multitude of individuals whose mutual contract is contained in the Supreme Constitution."F. Venter, Constitution Making and There are different possible answers in contemporary constitutional and political theory to the question of constituent power, at least four, as summarized by Loughlin and Walker: "(i) the juridical containment thesis, wherebyconstituentpowerisexhaustedbyandabsorbedwithinthesettledconstitutionalform,as,forexample, in much contemporary liberal theory based on contractarian assumptions (e.g. Rawls); (ii) the co-originality and mutualarticulationthesis,wherebythelegallyconstitutedpowerofthepolityoperatesinproductivetensionwith acontinuingbackgroundcommitmenttopopularsovereignty(e.g.Habermas);(iii)theradicalpotentionalthesis, whereby constituent power is neither colonized by nor in symbiosis with the legal, but remains a latent revolutionarypossibilitywhichliesbehindandshadowsthelegallyconstitutedauthorityofthepolity(e.g.Negri); and (iv) the irresolution thesis, which rejects the first two forms of accommodation, but also dismisses the possibility of isolating the radical potential of constituent from the constituted forms of sovereign power, and instead views constituent power as an irreducible supplement which irritates and challenges rather than transcendsthespecificformofconstitutedpower(e.g.Benjamin,Agamben)." LoughlinandWalker,supranote2, at6-7. 83 Theconstitution,alternatively,mayprovideatoolforcreatingthiscommonelementneededforthecohesionof peopleofcontemporarystates.Itservestomakeallconstituentgroupsandindividualsfeelthatthestateistheir own.Theymaynotsharecommonculturalheritageinthepresent;itispossiblethattheydidnotshareacultural heritageinthepast;mostimportantly,theymaynotberequestedeventodosointhefuture.Despiteallthis,they stillidentifythemselveswiththatdocument,theconstitution,inordertopreservetheunityofthepeople,andthe cohesion of the state. In other words, the importance of the constitution lies not in its expression of preestablishedpoliticalidentity,butinitsabilitytotransformitintoacivicone.AccordingtoPreuss:"Theconstituent power is simultaneously the creator of the constitution and the permanent threat to it. Yet, both functions are necessaryforthevitalityoftheconstitution."Preuss,supranote46,at164.Accordingly,"[w]hatmattersisnotthe pre-constitutionalshared-orunshared-identity,butthenewpoliticalidentitybasedontheconstitutionitself." Lerner, supra note 73, at 26. As pointed out by Preuss, "[t]he constitution, although created by the constituent power, must always fight against the tendency of its own creator to infuse pre-political elements into the structuresofpolitics."Preuss,supranote46,at148. In the words of Rosenfeld (commenting on Preuss contribution to the volume he edited): "The Constitutional subject cannot do away with either ethnicist or demotic influence. Indeed, without the former, such a subject wouldbereducedtoarootlessabstractiondevoidoflife;withoutthelatter,incontrast,suchasubjectwouldbe soblindlydrivenbyprepoliticalforcesthatitwouldbecompletelyincapableofgeneratingagenuineconstitutional order.AsPreussseesit,constitutionalismrequiresimposingrestraintsontheimpulsivedriveofethosthroughthe deployment of institutional devices designed to control the influence of prepolitical forces on the shaping of politics. The constitutional subject must therefore use constitution making as a means of subjugating ethos to demos."Rosenfeld,supranote20,at18.InPreuss'swords,"itistheveryrationaloftheconstitutiontotransform theunfathomablepoweroftheethosintoresponsibleauthorityofthedemos."Quotedin:Id.at18. 86 See,e.g.,Article2oftheConstitutionofAlgeria;Article2oftheConstitutionoftheKingdomofBahrain;Article2 oftheConstitutionofEgypt;Article2oftheConstitutionofJordan;Article2oftheConstitutionofKuwait;Article6 oftheConstitutionofMorocco;Article1oftheConstitutionofTunisia;Article7oftheConstitutionofUnitedArab Emirates(1971).Article4oftheBasicLawofthePalestinianAuthority (2002,2003withallamendments) AsHasanal-Banna,thespiritualfatheroftheMuslimBrothers,putsit:"Islamdoesnotrecognizegeographical frontiers and does not take into account racial differences. On the contrary, it considers all the Muslims as one ummaandregardsallMuslimcountriesasonewatan,regardlessofthedistanceandboundarieswhichseparate them." Bensaid, supra note 60, at 171. According to Sayyed Qutb, "the fatherland of a Muslim ceased to be a portionofland.Instead,hiswatanbecamethehomeofIslam,thelandinwhichIslamandIslamiclawarethesole authority." He then concludes: "Muslim's watan is not a piece of land, and his nationality is not that of a government.
" Quotedin:Id.at172-3(emphasisomitted).
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Olivier Roy distinguishes between Islamic movements, increasingly nationalized, and radicalism, which is by definitionde-territorialized:"C'estparl'inscriptiondeleuractionpolitiquedanslecadreterritorialdel'État-nation quelesmouvementsislamistessontdevenusnationalistes,oudumoinssesontnationalisés,àl'encontredeleur idéologie d'origine, qui se voulait internationaliste. En ce sens les grands mouvements islamistes ont été des facteurs de renforcement de l'État-nation et se retrouvent aujourd'hui proches des nationalistes laïcs dans leur opposition aux États-Unis. À l'inverse, le radicalisme violent est le propre de mouvements dé-territorialisés, commealQaïda."O.Roy,Islamismeetnationalisme104POUVOIRS45,53(2003)(emphasisomitted).
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The Pakistani el-Maududi (the founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan) invented then a new concept "alhakemmeyya"thatmeanssovereigntyinreferencetoGod,whileseyyada(translatedalsobysovereignty)refersto thepeople'spower. ForAbulAlaMaududi(1903 ForAbulAlaMaududi( -1979 sovereigntybelongstoGod;accordingly,an'Islamicstate' hasnorighttoexerciseauthorityexceptinsubordinationandinaccordancetotheLawrevealedbyGodandhis Prophet.M.M.SHARIF,AHISTORYOFMODERNPHILOSOPHY656 (Pakistan,1963 (Pakistan, -1966 In other words,thebindingcharacteroftheShari'aintheabovesenseisnothingotherthanthefreewill ofhumanauthority.TheempowermentofShari'a,throughtheconstitutionaltexts,meansthat a'secularwill'nota'divinewill'isattheoriginofitslegalcharacter.Accordingly,itisonthe lightof"sovereigntyisforthepeople",existentinConstitutionsofmostArabstates,thatthe recognitionofIslamasthereligionofstateandofShari'aas"sourceoflegislation"needstobe interpreted.
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This is particularly true in the absence of a religious authority competent to in an-Nabhani's opinion, rests on the following bases: 1) the predominance of Islamic law; 2) the government should be by the people; 3) people's obligation to instate one Caliph for all Muslims, as their representative in government;4)peoplehavetherighttoijtihadandtoproposelegalrulingsrequiredtodealwiththeproblemsof everyday life. According to him, the pillars of the state are seven: shura, the head of state, the executive body (assistants),theadministrativeapparatus,therulers(wulat),thejudiciaryandthearmy.Inhisview,legislationis onlythecompetenceoftheCaliphandofthepeople;andtherefore,theCaliphhastoconsultthepeople(shurais an obligation). The council of shura -and this is new-is not appointed, but elected from people of different regions. An-Nabhani crystallised his position by proposing a constitution. The nation for him constitutes the practicalmeansonearthofputtingIslamintoeffect,byscrutinizingandjudgingtheruler.Theideasofan-Nabhani affectedSayyidQutb whowasamemberoftheEgyptianBrotherhood,andbegantoconcernhimself withthequestionofsocialjusticeinIslam.Hedistinguishesbetweenpre-Islamic(jahiliyya)andIslamicsocieties. The first can never pursue solutions to their social problems because they are not ruled by Islam. Qutb refused moderate solutions under the concept of Islamic law as a main source of legislation. This radical position is also expressedbyYusufal-Qardawiwhopresentsthe'Islamicsolution':theestablishmentofanIslamicstatebasedon pureIslamicrule,whichhasinIslamiclegislationits'oneandonlyguide'and'reference'forallitsrulings.SeeF. Jadaane, NotionsoftheStateinContemporaryArab-IslamicWritings,inTHEFOUNDATIONSOFTHEARABSTATE112,132-9(GhSalaméed.,London,CroomHelmLtd1987 Shari'a] is the source of legislation) and Article3("Sovereigntyisforthepeoplealoneandtheyarethesourceofauthority")asfollows:"Whilesovereignty remainswiththepeople,therecognitionofIslamasthereligionofthestateimpliesthatthesovereigntyofthe peopleissubjecttotheauthorityofGod;thattheauthorityofthepeopleisagiftfromGod,andthattheyhave been appointed to execute and follow His will on earth." Sherif, supra note 89, at 158. At first instance, Sherif seemstoadoptanoppositepositionofwhatIhavedefendedsofar;acarefulreading,maysuggestthecomplete opposite.Infact,Sherifmakesaprecision;itisnotanissueofthewordingofthearticle,but,mostimportantly,it isanissueofinterpretation(notforreligiousclerk,butratherofthejudiciary).Forthisreason,hearguesthat,the "statement [that Islam is the religion of the state and that Shari'a the principle source of legislation] must be accompanied by judicial review." Sherif, supra note 89, at 159. Accordingly, in the case of Egypt, Article 2 will dependontheinterpretationoftheSupremeConstitutionalCourt.AccordingtoSherif,therearethreeprinciples determine what is and what is not part of Shari'a, rather it is the competence of the state authorities to determine that, each according to the competences determined by the constitution itself.
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In this regard, countries with 'judicial review' accord the judiciary an importantrole.
110 Thisdoesnotmean,however,thatconstitutionalprovisionsarenotrelevant, andthatanyconstitutionalprovisionwillbejustfine.Indeed,thecurrentformulations(related toIslamandShari'a)areopentomanyinterpretations,whichcanandmaybediscriminatory towardscitizenswhodonotsharesamereligiousfaith.
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Mostimportantly,judgesmayrefer that address the meaning of Shari'a within the constitutional framework: "First, it is acknowledged that Art. 2 formsanintegralorganicunitwiththerestoftheconstitution.Noprovisionmayoverruleanother;allprovisions must be interpreted in accordance with each other. Secondly, the constitutional obligation of the legislature to adheretotheShari'aisprospectivenotretrospectiveinnature.Thejudiciarymayinvalidatepost-1981lawsthat areinconsistentwithShari'a,butitmaynotinvalidatelawsthatpredatetheproclamationofArt.2.Andthirdly,in its application of the Shari'a, the [Supreme Constitutional Court] must always distinguish between definite and indefinitesources."Sherif,supranote89,at158.Themostimportantprinciple,andthemostdifficulttoapply,is thethirdone.Infact,"fewattemptshavebeenmadetoanalysethecontentofthisreferenceanditsmethods", which make the situation far from being a "clear-cut". See Dupret, supra note 89, at 161. The question will be, then,onwhodeterminewhichprincipleofShari'aisdefiniteandindefiniteorwhatmakespartoftheprinciplesof Shari'a and what does not? For Sherif, it is the Supreme Constitutional Court. See Sherif, supra note 89, at 158. Easytosay,butinpractice,thewayreferencestoIslaminEgyptianlegalpracticesaredoneiscomplex.SeeDupret, supra note 89, at 161. It is true that "the government must ensure that the dictates of God triumph over the desiresofman".Sherif,supranote89,at159.Still,itisthetaskofthegovernmenttodoso,underthescrutinyof theSupremeConstitutionalCourt.Summedup,itdoesn'tseemtomethatSherifistellingadifferentstoryfrom the one I do. For both of us, it is the state (the government, the legislature, the judiciary), not God or religious clerk,whoultimatelydecidewhenandhowtoapplywhatwithinstatelegalsystem.
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Asintherestoftheworld,thetwoavailableoptionsarethoseofthePresidentortheJudiciary.InEgyptfor example,thisprocessofaccommodatingShari'awithintheEgyptianlegalsystemisdoneunderthefinalscrutinyof theSupremeConstitutionalCourt.InAlgeria,theConstitution,whileitestablishesaConstitutionalCouncil,creates alsoSupremeIslamicCouncil,relatedtothePresident,withthetaskofprovidingopinionswithregardstoreligious precepts(Arts.171-173).Similarly,inEgypt,the"publicmanagementof[Islamasreligionofstate]isthedutyofthe Shaykhofal-azhar,oftheMuftīoftheRepublic."Dupret,supranote89,at162(emphasisomitted).
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InEgyptforexample,DupretscrutinizedtherulingsofEgyptianjudges,anddistinguishedfourcategories:(1) 'theobjectivation',(2)the'instrumentalisation',(3)the'overvalidation',(4)the'invalidation'."Thefirstismadeup of rulings defining the content of Islam as a recognized and eventually privileged religion, or of the Shari'a as a legislative reference. In the second category are found arguments utilising Islam as a source of legislation for rulingsrelatedfirstforemosttotheinstitutionalformofthestateortoaspecificconceptionofpublicorder.The thirdconcernsthepositiveratifyingofrulesofstatutelawwhosewordingisself-sufficientinitselfandsodoesnot explicitlyjustifythesamekindofreference.Finally,fourth,category,therewerecertainjudiciaryrulingsthatwent asfarasinvalidatingstatutelawinthenameoftheShari'a." Dupret, supranote89, MostArabconstitutions,infact,refertofreedomofconscience,worship,orreligiouspractice.Thisisthecase oftheConstitutionofAlgeria(Art.53),Bahrain(Art22),Egypt(Art46),Emirates(Art32),Jordan(Art.14),Kuwait (Art.35),Morocco(Art.6),Syria(Art.35),Tunisia(Art.5),PalestinianAuthority(Art.4).However,theylimitthis freedomtoexistingmonotheisticreligionsor'recognized'religions,andsubordinateit -asmuchasmanyother freedoms -to largely non-defined 'public order' or other conditions; thus, distinguishing between 'freedom of thought'and'freedomofworship'.AsitisthecaseinEgypt,inacaserelatedtowearingveilinpublicschools,the toShari'atojustifytheirjudgments,endingupbyconsecratingasingle,uniquepublicmorality, onethatdoesnotcontradictwith Shari'a(orthejudge'sunderstandingofwhatShari'ais) 112 , evenifinviolationofindividualsfreechoiceandliberties(forbothMuslimsandnon-Muslims, altogether). 113 The argument of 'cultural heritage' and the argument related to Islam as 'religion of the majority' is an attractive explanation for the reference to Islam and Shari'a. In most Arab constitutions,however,thepeopledidnotparticipateintheprocessofconstitution-makingor amendment. As already noted earlier, it is often the regimes in power that constitute the constitutions,nottheotherwayaround. While doing so, the judge present his ruling as ethically, socially, and historically based. As pointed out by Dupret:"Aruleexistsastheinclusionofanunderstandingthatwefeelinharmonywithothers."Id.at157 113 Thevarietyofcases,inwhichajudgecanrefertoShari'aisinteresting;itmayextendtovariousdomainsand fields.InEgypt,forexample,thisoccurredinacaserelatedtowearingveilsinpublicschools,torefusingthetitleof professor, on the grounds of attacking Islam and saying heretical things, and to authorizing for sex change operations.Seeid.at172-8.
114
The'returntoShari'a'isbeingusedrhetorically,evenamongMuslimintellectuals,focusingprimarilyonissues of public dress and ritual conduct, but also invoking the idea of the Shari'a as a total way of life. See Brockopp, supranote102,at618. ForSherif," [t] hecredibilityofasystemofgovernmentassuchdependslargelyonitsrespectfortheShari'a,as itisveryunlikelyforitspeopletotrustagovernmentthatdoesnotrespondtoGod.Thepeoplewillnotcallforthe implementationofaconstitutiontheydonotbelievein.theywillnotcallforabalanceofpoweringovernment unlessitisaccordingtotermstheybelievein."Sherif,supranote89,at159.Ireadthisstatementassupporting the claim I make here, that reference to Islam and Shari'a serves the regimes to get accepted, to get the law implementedbecausedeemedinconformityinpopularbeliefs. 30CLPERESEARCHPAPERSERIES[VOL.06NO.02 constitutionalprovisionsareoftenused,bycurrentregimes,asa'language'or'codes'totalk, or communicate with, constituencies. The constitutions of Arab states refer to Islam and Shari'a, but they also refer to equality, rights and freedoms. They talk about citizenship and democracy, limited government and accountability.
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Those constitutional provisions are directed towards different constituencies. They serve different purposes. Those are different pulses,goingtodifferentdirections.However,theyhaveonethingincommon;theyallserve the current regimes to communicate with the various constituencies, whether in the local, regionalorinternational.
Onethingiscertain,however.IncontemporaryArabstates,therelationbetweenreligionand stateisbecomingincreasinglyproblematic.
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Infact,theadvantageofShari'aisthatyoucan invoke it to support anything you want. The disadvantage is that everybody understands that.
121 ReferencetoIslamortoShari'aisoftenused,nottosupportcurrentregimes,buttocall forrebellionagainstthem. 122 FormanyIslamistgroups,thecurrentArabstatesarenotIslamic at all or, at least, not enough (seeing the current map of Arab and Muslim states, which are territorially defined, it is maybe more correct to say that, for some fundamentalist groups, 119 Itisalsolargelyrelatedtothesyncretisminconstitutionmakinginthenewera.Insuchconstitutions,itisvery possibletofindtwoextremelycontradictingprovisionsinthesameconstitutionaltext.Syncretisminasensedoes not encourage reaching compromises (intended as half way between two extremes, where everybody gives up something to reach a common ground), rather it encourages each influential group or individual to give up somethingonthepriceofanother,elsewhere(publicspace,here,isperceivedasvariousparcelsorfields)ending upbyhavingacollectionofoppositesinthesametext.Suchasyncretismisnottobeintendedasasynthesisbut ratherasacollectionofthesisandanti-thesisinaveryspontaneousandun-reflectedway.Insuchacontext,no provisionisindispensable(manyprovisionsonwhichtheremaybeadisagreementsimplydisappear)whilemany others can appear 'from above,' in one of the different stages of constitution-drafting, discussing, or even endorsing.Suchasituationpushesmetosuspectthattheonlydecisionundertakenbytheconstitution-framersis, indeed,toavoidtakingdecisions,forthesakeandfortheonlyadvantageofhavingaconstitutionaltextassuch.
FormoreabouttheconceptofstateinArab-Islamicwriting,seeJadaane,supranote106.Forasummary,see Khalil, supranote27, IborrowthecolorfulcritiqueofJohnHartElyagainstNaturallaw(citedin:Feldman,supranote84,at237),to make a parallel critique to possible reference to Shari'a in modern Arab states, conceived as a standard that determines the binding character of (state-positive) law (thus, Shari'a in a sense play the role of that standard which effectively determines whether a law is binding, thus, is law). For natural law theorists, indeed, "law is a rationalstandardforconduct."M.Murphy,Chapter1:NaturalLawTheory,inTHEBLACKWELLGUIDETOTHEPHILOSOPHY OFLAWANDLEGALTHEORY15,15(M.P.GoldingandW.A.Edmundsoneds.,BlackwellPublishing,2005 IslamicradicalismdenouncesthealmostforgottenIslamicShari'a(seeBotiveau,supranote117,at262)despite thereferencetoIslamandtoShari'ainconstitutionaltexts. 124 Interestingly,IslamistmovementseemmoreopentopoliticalsystemsdevelopedinWesterndemocracies.As pointedoutbyBensaid:"ItisamazingtonotethattheIslamistattitudetowardstheEuropeanpoliticalmodelis moreopenandpositivethanthepan-Arabattitude.ThelatterrejectstheOccidentandrefusestoimportforeign politicalnotionsthatdonotreflectthegenuineauthenticitywhichtheArabnationseekstorecover.Contraryto this introverted attitude, the Islamist attitude is marked by openness and even willingness to borrow from the Occident." See Bensaid, supra note 60, at 169-170. Hassan al-Banna showed an interest to the principles that direct a constitutional government since they correspond with Islam: "When one considers the principles that guidetheconstitutionalsystemofgovernment,onefindsthatsuchprinciplesaimtopreserveinallitsformsthe freedomoftheindividualcitizen,tomakerulersaccountablefortheiractionstothepeople,and,finally,todelimit the prerogatives of every single authoritative body. It will be clear to everyone that such basic principles correspond perfectly to the teaching of Islam concerning the system of government. For this reason, Muslim brothersconsiderthat,ofalltheexistingsystemsofgovernment,theconstitutionalsystemistheformthatbest suitsIslamandMuslims."Quotedin:Bensaid,supranote60,170. Thisisnottoarguethattherewasnotalso,withinIslamicmovement,somestrongvoicesagainst"democracy"asa Western, and hence "bad" product. M. Chibli, On the Specificity of Middle Eastern Constitutionalism, 38 CASEW. RES. J. INT.L L. 13, 44 (2006) . This may lead some to conclude that there is incompatibility between Islam and democracy.Theissueofcompatibilityorincompatibilitygoesbeyondourmainconcernsinthispaper.Onethingis sure, however, as pointed out by Mallat: "This should leave us with the acknowledgement that the zero-sum debateonincompatibilityorcompatibilitybetweenIslamanddemocracyofteninterchangeablewith"theWest"-will remain active and unanswered for some time, until at least some of the political dust settles and a stable politicalandeconomiccourseisreachedinoneormoreMiddleEasterncountries." Chibli, supra, at45. 125 Many suspect that the 'resurgence' of 'political' Islam is the most salient features of contemporary Middle Easternpolitics.However,thispoliticalIslamisnotnecessarilyareplacementforsecularnationalism,ratheritisan integralcomponentofpersonalandcollectiveidentitythathasbeenignored,suppressedandcrudelymanipulated by the state. D. F. Eickelmm, Changing perceptions of state authority: Morocco, Egypt and Oman, in THE FOUNDATIONSOFTHEARABSTATE177,200(GhSalaméed.,London,CroomHelmLtd1987 138 Itisnotconstitutionalismaslimited government that is problematic; on the contrary; limiting the government by making a referencetoasuperiornormativeorderthatgoesbeyondthestateiscompletelycoherentwith Arab and Islamic culture. Instead, it is often the case that the obstacles towards limited government can be found in the existing Arab regimes themselves, which show different degreesofreticencetowardstransitiontodemocracy.EventhereferencetoIslamandShari'a inmostconstitutionsofArabstatescanbecitedasanexampleofsubscribingArabstatestothe principleof'limitedgovernment'(somehaveevencalledthis,'Islamicconstitutionalism').
The'problem'withmodernconstitutionalism 139 isthatitgoesbeyondthe'limitedgovernment'. It includes also two other elements: the adherence to the rule of law and the protection of humanrights.Theproblemwithsuchtwoelements,aspartofthatnormativeorderlimitingthe government, is that they may (and effectively they often do) compete with other normative orders in Arab states. A clash may occur when certain rights are violated, based on that normative(largelyreligious,butalsohistoricallyandculturallycontingent)framework,referred to with the very generic term of Shari'a. Two examples, often cited, are of real concerns for individuals living in many Arab and Islamic countries: religious minorities and women.
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In a 135 SeeBahlul, supranote133, at515. 136 This is also the case in Japan for example, where the concept of constitutionalism is unknown. See Hasebe, supranote77, at240. 137 SeeBahlul, supranote133, at515. 138 In an earlier study, I showed how Arabic and Islamic philosophies (such as those that can be traced in Ibn KhaldunandAl-Farabi)maysubscribeeasilytowhatisnowcalledconstitutionalism.seeKhalil,supranote27,at 148-57; Asem Khalil, The Enactment of Constituent Power in the Arab World, ANCILLA IURIS (ANCHI.CH) 88, 95-97 (2006) . As pointed out by Rosenfeld, "[t]here appears to be no accepted definition of constitutionalism but, in the broadest terms, modern constitutionalism requires imposing limits on the powers of government, adherence to theruleoflaw,andtheprotectionoffundamentalrights." Rosenfeld, supranote20, at3. 140 This explains why many Arab states expressed their reserves on many international conventions related to Human Rights, with regards to articles related to freedom of thought, and women's rights, often with express 34CLPERESEARCHPAPERSERIES[VOL. 06NO.02 sense, "equality is inextricably linked to modern constitutionalism", 141 that it is impossible to perceive (modern) constitutionalism without it.
142 It is by this equality component, that constitutionalism becomes, not a limitation to democracy, but rather, its enhancement, accomplishmentandrealization.
Forminoritiesandwomen'srights,thereferenceisoftenmadetohumanrights,asdefinedby international law. They are perceived to be universal, not dependent on (cultural, social, historical AccordingtoThomasFranck,"[t]hisisanirreversibleevolutionofinternationallaw:Thisnewlyemerging"law"-whichrequiresdemocracytovalidategovernance-isnotmerelythelawofaparticularstatethat,liketheUnited States under its Constitution, has imposed such a precondition on national governance. It is also becoming a requirement of international law, applicable to all and implemented through global standards, with the help of regional and international organizations." Th. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 THE AMERICANJOURNALOFINTERNATIONALLAW46,47(1992). are multiple.
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In the Arab world, this was the case in Iraq, 152 and largely the case of the PalestinianAuthorityafterOslo,initsefforttowriteaBasicLawandaDraftConstitutionforthe State. 153 Many explanations are given for this phenomenon: the evolution of international law and international society and the relations between states altered the notion of sovereignty; the weaknessofstatesinthethirdworldandthemultiplicationofcrisissituationsandthewillof developedcountriestoactagainstthesecriseshadledtothechangingoftheraisond'êtreof peace-keeping and peace-making operations. 154 Most importantly, it is related to the increasingnumberofstatesandthefactthattheformationofmostofthemfollowedaconflict situation.Insuchacontext,theconstitutionisoftenconnectedtoapeacetreatybetweennew neighbors, through which one can formalize a modus vivendi of various ethnic, national, religious,linguisticgroupsthatare'condemned'toliveinthesamestate.
In those cases, the involvement of international organizations and foreign countries in the constitution-making process of new born states is clear. It is in a sense a contradiction, why despite the globalization, differences, often of great measures, still exist between various political systems and constitutional texts. It is also surprising how this globalization movement oftencarrieswithitamovementthatImaycall'returntotheorigins',insistenceonculturalparticularities,and national exceptionalism. Those tendencies are maybe a reaction to 'mondialization', 'universalization' and 'internationalization',thatcanbesummarizedunder'globalization'.Thiscontradiction,Ibelieve,isonlyapparent, because globalization does not mean complete hegemony. In a different context, Go outlined that, "while the norms or hegemonic assumptions of world society contributed to the fact that postcolonies adopted written constitutions, particularities in any given constitution were shaped by subglobal (and yet not quite national) registers:imperial,religiousandideological.Theindependenceconstitutionsthereforerevealthatiftherewasa worldsocietythatdeterminedconstitutionalconstruction,itwasasocietyfracturedinternallybymultiplescalesof influence. Constitutional models flowed intra-imperially and, in the case of religion and Communism, transnationally.Nosingleconstitutionalmodelhadreachedthepointofglobaldominance."Go,supranote14,at 97.
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Scholars, interested in the constitutions adopted during the 'new era of constitutionalism' notice this phenomenonofconvergenceanddivergencethatexist.Theyexplainthisbythewaynewconstitutionsaremade; they called it with specific names: 'syncretism' (See Go, supra note 14, at 104 ), 'bricolage,' (see Tushnet, supra note 66, at 1285-6), 'gardening' (e.g. R. R. Ludwikowski, "Mixed" Constitutions -Product of an East-Central EuropeanConstitutionalMeltingPot16B.U. Int'lL.J.1,64(1998) ), 'plagiarism'(SeeLANE, supranote20, at196), or'distortion'(SeeOsiatynski, supranote25, at267) . 160 Rich countries for example may use subordinate their foreign and cooperation policy by the adherence of newborn states and weak states to such a model. The risk here is to suffocate the local population, their particularitiesandtheirculture.Thismayhaveaboomerangeffect,withnegativeconsequencesontheefficiency oftheconstitutionaltext,sincetheconstitutionmaybeconsideredasan'outsideproduct'. 161 The paradox resides in the substitution of the national constituency by an international one. The marginalizationoftheconcernedpeopleornation,entitled,theoretically,toconstituentpower,leadstocreatinga heteronymousconstitution;animposedconstitutionratherthanvoluntarilyadopted,whichleavesaquestionof legitimacyofsuchenactments.Intheinternationallaw,thereisnoparadoxatall,butinconstitutionallaw,thisis particularlyproblematicsincethepeopledonotparticipateeffectivelyinthepreparationandtheadoptionofsuch a constitution, causing a setback regarding internal sovereignty of the state. Pierre-Caps noticed that: «C'est précisément(la)créationradicaledelaconstitution,envertud'unedécisiondupouvoirconstituantdelanation, qui tend à être remise en cause aujourd'hui. Et, paradoxalement, cela tient aussi au succès rencontré par la conceptionnormativedelaconstitution.(…)Enprivantainsilepouvoirconstituantdesoncaractèredynamiqueet volontaire,etsanspourautantremettreencausel'idéemêmedupouvoirconstituantdupeupleoudelanation, 40CLPERESEARCHPAPERSERIES[VOL.06NO.02 national law to principles and norms of international law), but from the perspectives of domesticpubliclaw.
IX.CONCLUSION
The constitutions of many Arab states are evolving; their political and legal systems are in a continuous state of flux. They have undergone experiences, witnessed the world over; this includesthewaytheiridentityisevolving,increasinglyanddefinitively,aroundtheirterritorially definedstate.ContemporaryArabstatesare-asmuchasotherstates-politicalratherthan religiousentities;theirauthorityis,bydefinition,dependentonthedemoticconceptofpeople, largely defined by state positive law. Arab states are also increasingly interested in written constitutions, because they provide a valid legitimating tool; most importantly, they are increasinglyattractedtowardsconstitutionalism.
Regardlessofwhetherhumanrights,ruleoflaw,anddemocracyarecompatiblewithShari'aas such, or whether the argument of cultural and religious particularity is simply presented by existing regimes to justify the lack of democracy and the deficiency in their human rights protectionrecord,theissueatstakeistodeterminewhatis'universal'oruniversallyvalid,and what can be 'culturally contingent'. In my account, which is largely historical and descriptiveanalytical, I perceive the development towards more protection of human rights (largely as a reactiontotheatrocitiesofstatesinSecondWorldWar)inbothstates'legalsystems,andin internationallaw,asfavoringthethesisofuniversality.Thewaythisprotectionisdone,andon which normative basis, is irrelevant as such. It can be international law or constitutional law, butitcanalsobeareligiousnormativeorder.
However, in case of contradiction between those normative orders (international and constitutionallawontheoneside,andreligiouslawontheother),andseentheimpossibilityof determininginadefinitiveway,whatmakespartofthatreligiousnormativeorder,itisforstate authorities (again, secular not religious authorities) to make a choice. In fact, when an Arab state opts for the religious normative order, it does not make reference to a unique and commonlysharednormativeorder,butratheritisthestateitselfthatdefinesandshapesthat normativeorder.InthissenseIdiscussedShari'alargely'confinedtotheremitofpositivelaw'. The issue, in my account, is not whether or not Arab states should conform to Shari'a, as a normativeorder,butwhetherornotthestate,assovereigns,canbere-introducedwithinthe cetteintrusionnormativedanslepouvoirconstituantlaisseentrevoirlapossibilitéd'uneconstitutiondétachéede son substrat national, désincarnée, 'dénationalisée' en un mot, pur engrenage de normes hiérarchisées…». S. Pierre-Caps,Leconstitutionnalismeetlanation,inLENOUVEAUCONSTITUTIONNALISME,MELANGESENL'HONNEURDEGERARD CONAC72 (Economica,2001) .Quotedin:MAZIAU,supranote149,at6. domain of legality, and whether state-positive law can be subordinated to a normative order thatgoesbeyondthepositivelaw.
InthispaperIhavearguedthatthiscanbethecase.Therearealsogoodreasonstobelievethat itoughttobeso.ManyArabstatesareunderinternalandexternalpressuresandtheirstability asstatesareatstake.Iarguethatonewayout(andmaybetheonlyone)istoevolvetowards constitutionalism,wherelegitimacydepends,notonthewayastateoraregimeisestablished, butuponthewaygovernmentisexercised.ThestabilityofArabstatesdependslargelyontheir legitimacy, and their legitimacy is dependent on the success of this evolution towards constitutionalism.ItmaybetruethatonlyafewArabstatescanbeconsideredasindigenous creations;mostofthemindeeddidnotdevelopasanindigenousandgenuineproductandtheir borders may have been created artificially. Accordingly, they may have dubious origins, but theycanhaveacertainfuture;theiridentitywilldependlargely,notonwhattheywere,buton what they want to be. In such an identity, no one is excluded a priori, but no one has the monopolyovertheidentityitself.Apoliticalsystemthatincorporatessuchavisionisopentoall individuals(regardlessoftheirsex,religion,orethnicity)andtoallparties,whethernationalist, Islamist, or transnational, on the condition that there is an agreement over the need to maintainthebasisofthepoliticalprocessitself;thatpoliticalprocessis,inthefirstplace,what gavethemtheopportunitytoexistandtoexposetheirneeds,theirviews,andtheirwishesto thepublic,notasmereprivateconcernsbutaspublicones.
If the rejection of constitutionalism, as limited government, is the result of the reticence of existing regimes, unwilling to realize a transition to democracy, resistance to modern constitutionalism,asanormativeorderinwhichhumanrightsareanintegralpart,goesbeyond thetotalitarianregimes.Itisindeedoftenthecasethatnational,religious,historicalorcultural particularities are used as narratives to discredit modern constitutionalism; the latter being considered essentially 'Western', not adapted for other cultures, such as the Arab-Islamic culture.
Thequestionis,then,howcanmodernconstitutionalismbeattractiveforanArabstate,ifand whensuchnormativeorderclasheswithreligiousandmoralpreceptsofitspopulation?Most perplexing is the fact that most Arab constitutions refer to Shari'a and Islam in their constitution,thusgivingitakindofsupremacy,entrenchedbythesamecanonicalconstitution. Isn't it then that constitutionalism, which entails the subordination of the government to a superiornormativeorder,largelyentrenchedinawrittenconstitutionthatwillleadinevitably to the rejection of any competing normative orders? Isn't it in the name of constitutionalism that modern constitutionalism can be rejected? In other words, modern constitutionalism appears to be contradicting and competing with other available normative orders, within the samelegalsystem.
Nothing in what I advanced in this paper argues that modern constitutionalism contradicts necessarilywithaparticularreligion,morality,orcultureinspecific.Atthesametime,itdoes 42CLPERESEARCHPAPERSERIES[VOL.06NO.02 notexcludethepossibilitythatmodernconstitutionalismmaycompetewiththemanyexisting normative orders, that compete within the same legal system. On the contrary, there are seriousgroundstobelievethatitisoftenthecase,notonlyinIslamicandArabcountries,but also in Asian countries, as much as in Western countries. What this paper challenged is the rejection of modern constitutionalism based on the historical, religious and cultural particularities of each state. It is true that most prevalent concepts and principles related to modern states, territorially defined, are largely formulated in the West, based on particular historicalexperiences.Itisalsotruehoweverthatsimilarpathcanbetracedinothercontexts, including the Arab and Islamic history. 162 However, it was not my concern in this paper to conciliatemodernconstitutionalismwithArabandIslamicculture.Itwasnotevenmyconcern todefendmodernconstitutionalismislamically,thususingargumentsfromwithintheshari'ato provethatmodernconstitutionalism(thus,humanrights,democracy,ruleoflaw,etc.)donot contradictwithIslam.
Rather,myargumentisthatthecoreproblemiselsewhere.Inmyaccount,theissueatstakeis rathertobeabletoexplainandjustifywhyandhowisitpossibletolimitstates'powersbya superior normative order, in which human rights is an essential part? How can we still talk about sovereign states, when those sovereigns are introduced to the domain of legality, and when,atthesametime,theydonotmonopolizethetaskofdefiningofwhatislegalandwhat isillegal?Isn'tittheendofnationalstates?Isn'titacontradictionwithstates'sovereigntyand superiority? Isn't it a new kind of hegemony (colonialism, imperialism or whatever other expression that can be found in the literature…) towards weak state exercised, exercised by strongstates?
Switching the discussion from cultural and religious exceptionalism to an issue of state sovereignty has the advantage of relocating the discussion within the theory of state. Most importantly,ithastheadvantageofavoidingafallacythatresistingmodernconstitutionalism, asnormativeorderlimitingsovereignstates,isanexclusiveconcernofAraborIslamicstates. Skepticism towards modern constitutionalism is indeed present elsewhere. Regardless of the 162 This is not to argue, however, that Arab states' continuous research for constitutional legitimacy can only be realized through a return to the past (whether to ethnic or religious identities, that go beyond all and each concerned Arab states), but rather in their capacity to project a better future, arguing that legal/philosophical revolutions, irrespective of the place of their formulation, are universally accepted and applied in contemporary states, including Arab and Muslim states. We can distinguish between Islamic and Muslim state, used often throughoutthispaper.Thedistinctiononlydatestothelatetwentiethcentury,inthecontextofwhatiscalled'the Islamic resurgence'. Since then, some made a distinction between Muslim used as an adjective and Islamic. However, "[t]he term Muslim is increasingly identified with the existing community and the practices of people self-identified as Muslim. The term "Islamic" has sometimes been reserved for those instances where there is a consciousefforttoreflectthefundamentalprinciplesandidealsofIslaminterpretedinarelativelyrestrictiveway. In this usage, for example, a "Muslim state" is a state where the majority of the people are Muslim, while an "Islamicstate"wouldbeoneinwhichthereisaformalprogramofimplementationoftheregulationsandidealsof Islam." Islam"remainstheidentificationofthereligionunderlyingbothusages."Voll, supranote116, at360. varieties of reasons behind such resistance or rejection of modern constitutionalism, the argumentthispaperadvanceisthattheconcernsbehindit,fromtheperspectiveofthetheory of state, are largely the same. The reticence of contemporary states to modern constitutionalism is accompanied by fierce attack by many scholars; such attack explains to a large extent why there is no doctrinal agreement about what constitutionalism is at the first place. In my account, this skepticism towards, resistance and rejection of modern constitutionalism, is not explicable by reference to religious or cultural particularities, but ratherbythefactthatwearelookingatnewrealitieswitholdlenses. 163 Modern constitutionalism is indeed crystallized as a result of the development of both international law and national legal systems, towards more protection of human rights. It is truethatthecentralityofhumanrightsmayhavetracesthatcanbefoundaslateastheendof the 19 th century, where international law developed towards imposing more limitations on states in times of armed conflicts. Such evolution had had a considerable success and known large diffusion following the dissolution of the USSR. In my narration, however, modern constitutionalism,inwhichtheprotectionofhumanrightsisanessentialcomponent,isnotthe product of the late 19 th century, or the post-Soviet Union, it is rather the result of the postSecond World War. States that witnessed the atrocities of gross violations of human rights during the Second World War seem to be saying, through modern constitutionalism: 'never again'. Modern constitutionalism is nothing else but that normative order that makes 'never again' a legal reality in domestic legal systems. Accordingly, the development of modern constitutionalism,inwhichprotectionofhumanrightsisanessentialpart,isnotWestern,but universalbydefinition.
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I borrowed this metaphor from Schauer, interested in discussing what other scholars refer to as 'imposed constitutionalism',"InthispaperIseektoexplainthisphenomenon,aphenomenonthatwill,enpassant,illustrate why seeing constitutions as necessarily either indigenous or imposed is invariably to see today's constitutions through yesterday's lenses." Frederick Schauer, On Migration of Constitutional Ideas, 37 CONN. L. REV. 907, 907 (2005) .
